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Abstract-In this paper we present an approach for specifying respect to security. When an organization wants to secure
and prioritizing information security requirements in organiza- its systems, it must first determine what requirements to
tions. We propose to explicitly link security requirements with the meet. Given that organizations normally have limited resources
organization's business vision, i.e. to provide business rationale t. Giventhatoraitis norally im itederercefor security requirements. The rationale is then used as a basis to rotect their assets t S equally important to determine
for comparing the importance of different security requirements. which requirements are more important and thus should be
Furthermore we discuss how to integrate the aforementioned prioritized. To achieve this, we propose to use a conceptual
solution concepts into a service level management process for framework where security requirements are linked to the
security services, which is an important step in IT Governance, unique business drivers of the organization in question. Figure
I. INTRODUCTION 1 portrays the conceptual framework. The business vision
consists of high level business goals the organization has. Crit-It i clar hatenir mnagrs i may oganiatins re cal Impact Factors (CIFs) identify what willl be the business
now expressing a much greater interest in information security
[1]. Understanding and specifying what kind of security an impacts if security requirements are violated. Valuable assets
organization need is however a difficult task. Many underlying and their security requirements are inventories of security
requirements. Valuable assets and their security requirementsgoals (why and what security iS needed) remain tacit within or- hv nefc nteCF n h Isi unipc
ganizations and requirements end up being articulated as spec- he an effect on the CIFs and the CIFs in turn impact
ifications of the security control baseline (how security will be-. . .
other words, we can use an organization's business vision toachieved) without a clear rationale. The aim of this paper iS proitz th CIs whc a eue ofrhrpirtz
to develop techniques and instruments to help stakeholders prioriti teqCiFs,ewhich acabeue to urthre prioriti
articulate the connection between security requirements and te serty requreen. to ac that,otre sue nt
business drivers in a systematic way. This connection is needed sneps need to betk. irtya Sorniao CF and
to provide the rationale to prioritize security requirements. The busess vision neeto be dein secondly weqneedtoenumerate valuable assets and their security requirements.
reason of making explicit the business rationale behind secu- Thirdly, security requirements shall be linked with CIFs and
rity requirement is twofold. Firstly, it forces the stakeholders to business vision. For a detailed illustration of the framework,
turn their intuition into explicit judgments - judgments that are we refer readers to [2].based on business goals and whose underlying assumptions are
discussed openly. Secondly, since hundred per cent security is III. INTEGRATING THE SOLUTION CONCEPTS INTO
not achievable and the limited resources available should be SERVICE LEVEL MANAGEMENT CYCLE
directed to satisfy the most important ones, we need a way to The solution concepts presented in the previous section
prioritize security requirements. The business rationale serves
.. . . ~~~~~~~areof practical usage only when they can be integrated
as the underlying criterion for evaluating how important each i piz
security requirement is. i~~~nto processes and activities conducted in an organization. Insecurity requiremenlt S this section, we discuss how our solution concepts can be
II. FORMULATING AND UNDERSTANDING SECURITY integrated in service level agreements (SLAs) in the context
GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS of IT governance.
Figure 2 shows an abstract process model taken from [3],
Ampact- a d which describes the process of managing and maintaining
Businlessvision Critical m c F tors ltheirs uriy service level agreements. In Figure 2, it has been adapted to
prk< requirements the security domain. The left part of the lemniscate concerns
the specification of security services (upper arrow) and the
Fig. 1. Linking security requirements with business vision via CIF. evlainndm itrgofhepfraceftesrie
provider (lower arrow). The right part concerns the evaluation
A security requirement specification tells what should be and monitoring of security service processes (upper arrow) and
secured and why. It identifies the organization's needs with the design and organization of those processes. The service
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Xep&646 an:d qun6(rift SLAzST ta svic,ress< LATwwd1vd1&organization's own security officer's input. 3) The valuable
/ Servi&e Level .S<> 8/=ffi$ S. business assets are listed and prioritized using the CIF impact
A~eblent}f < ~Scurity Service analysis. This step is performed by the business unit and ITS:curityServilce Service Level Service Process ISpu
Demaridm t Managernent Management security unit together. 4) For the prioritized business assets, IT
security unit identifies the IT assets that are needed to support
the business assets and further identifies the desired security
TrknadrrlyaleWala,aifrSLA4s XsigfM: rgafdiraK-De:trigs s~properties for the IT assets. 5) SLAs are prepared by IT and
Fig. 2. Security service level management lemniscate adapted from [3]. proposed to the business unit. 6) Due to budget concerns and
maybe other causes, business may decide to accept a higher
risk for certain assets in return for a lower service price. 7)
Finally, the new SLAs must be reviewed by IT to make sure
level management lemniscate is an abstract model that needs that the higher risks in one business unit does not impose
to be refined for the particular case at hand. Figure 3 shows unacceptable high risks to other business units. This could
our proposed refinement, in which the upper-left arrow of happen because of the inter-dependence of processes across
Figure 2 has been refined into seven process steps. The vertical business units.
dimension depicts the distinction between the IT demand side
of an organization (Business, i.e. those organizational units
where IT is used but not provided) and the IT supply side (IT, Information security is ultimately about business security.
i.e. those organizational units that provide IT services). The In this paper, we have proposed a conceptual framework that
figure shows that in our vision, the need for security services makes the link between security requirements and the orga-
originate at the demand side, in the sense that it is ultimately nization's business drivers explicit. The three main elements
the demand side that is harmed by breaches resulting from of our framework are business vision, CIFs and valuable
lack of security. It is also the demand side that is responsible assets and their security requirements. The connection between
for determining the business vision and critical impact factors business goals and security requirements, once established,
(but often, the IT supply side provides help in carrying out can be used to provide rationale for prioritizing security
these steps). The IT side then takes over, and the whole process requirements. The conceptual framework presented in this
results in SLAs that formalize the relation between the demand paper is only useful in practice when it is embedded in a
side and supply side. concrete process for security management. In this paper, we
have shown how this can be accomplished in the context of IT
T------------ ------ --- service level management. We have evaluated our approach by
r means of a focus group session at a large financial institution.| Our experience with the focus group session tells us that
-------- __-- giving people the appropriate tools to frame and structure
|BusinesswvonsamnD iucaialm Ftors their decision making process in relation to the underlyingI1 de baad on ar e identied for FelValieDisc#Jfine givenbusow visions gE;business goals and encouraging the right kind of dialog among
stakeholders are beneficial to the delivery of high quality
services. From what we have learned, several directions for
-'------ - - - - - -
peenh
BSNs t further research become apparent. For example, our focus
lL . |jgroup indicated that creating security awareness is a very
RoqLked soaffitY
Now= LAs ntibe l critical success factor. It is also our intention to extend our
assetsareidntffid | IUVAVed toardllislk s. ;=-n I security management process to cover tracking and evaluating
SlAsare,pmposd |service level agreements.
ba3sed on Xf swC*
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Critical Impact Factors are identified based on a combination
of industry specific CIFs, reviews of peer CIFs and the
